Priest's Reply to the Paradoxes of Nonexistence is Not Fully General
The gist of Braun’s objection is that it’s not the case that, in all cases, the conditions on successful reference are satisfied even if there are fictional, mythical, and imaginary objects and even if we can refer to such thing (note that these two claims are different on Priest’s view).
Braun’s First Objection
1. If LeVerrier’s uses of ‘Vulcan’ referred to Vulcan, then Vulcan satisfies the reference-fixing description by which LeVerrier introduced the name.
2. Vulcan does not satisfy that description.
3. So LeVerrier’s uses of ‘Vulcan’ did not refer to Vulcan.
4. If (3), then there are empty names.
5. So there are empty names.
(1) Given the theory of reference, LeVerrier’s initial uses of ‘Vulcan’ either refer because LeVerrier was in causal/perceptual contact with Vulcan, or because Vulcan satisfies the reference-fixing description via which LeVerrier introduced the name. Since the former is not the case, the latter must be. So (1) is true.
(2) If our uses of ‘Vulcan’ refer, then they refer to an abstract mythical object that is not a planet, perturbs no orbits, etc. So (2) is true.
A Priestly Reply
I think Priest would deny (2). Priest, as with all Meinongians, defends a version of the Characterization Principle. Its naïve form is as follows:
(CP) For any property or conjunction of properties A(x), we can characterize an object o and be guaranteed that A(o).
(CP) is unacceptable in this form. We can use (CP) to prove the existence of arbitrary entities; worse, we can use it to prove arbitrary truths. (CP) is inconsistent.
Proof of Arbitrary Existing Entities
The trick here is just to include existence in the set of properties. So let A(x) be any conjunction of properties, and let B = A(x) & E(x). By applying (CP) to B, we have an object o such that A(o) & E(o). So we’ve proved that something with an arbitrary conjunction of properties exists.
Proof of Arbitrary Truth
Let A be an arbitrary sentence. Let B = [(x = x) & A]. By applying (CP) to B, we have an object o such that (o = o) & A. By conjunction elimination, we infer A.
This sort of problem, noted by Russell and others, has prompted Meinongians to seek restrictions on (CP) that are consistent but remain true to the spirit of the Meinongian idea that an object of thought can be characterized in just about any way and still be thought of.
Priest’s proposal is novel. Let A(x) be any conjunction of properties. One can intend an object that satisfies exactly those properties. Let ‘o’ rigidly designate that object. If a is the intending agent, and B is the relevant intentional operator, then aB(A(o)) is true at @. So at every w such that w is accessible from @ under B for a, A(o) is true at w. That is, the objects in question do not necessarily have all of their characterinzig properties at the actual world, but they do have them at some world or other.
Before returning to Priest’s reply to Braun’s first argument, let’s forestall a potential objection to Priest’s proposal. Suppose ‘Necessarily F’ is our characterizing property. Then in some world, there is an object that has that property. But doesn’t this entail that that object is actually F? No. The world in question must be an impossible world if the object in question is not actually necessarily F.
Given Priest’s version of (CP), Priest may resist (2). Vulcan does have the properties specified in the reference-fixing description 'the planet causing perturbations in the orbit of Mercury'. It just does not have them actually. So Priest may avoid Braun’s first objection. (We might worry about what happens if the reference-fixing description is 'the actual planet causing perturbations in the orbit of Mercury'. Let's hold that thought for a minute and grant that Priest can avoid objection one.)
Caplan’s Objection
Priest’s reply to Braun’s first objection appears to play him into the hands of an objection from Caplan, however (plausibly, this sort of objection is originally attributable to Kripke). Priest’s view is that something has the properties LeVerrier attributed to Vulcan at some non-actual world. But it is not the only such thing. There are infinitely many possible objects, in fact, that have the properties LeVerrier attributed to Vulcan. So the description is not reference-fixing, since it is not definite. The description is satisfied by many non-existent objects. We can state the objection as follows:
1. If LeVerrier’s uses of ‘Vulcan’ refer to Vulcan, then there is a unique entity that satisfies the reference-fixing description, 'the planet causing perturbations in the orbit of Mercury'.
2. There is no unique entity that satisfies that description. (On Priest’s view, there are too many of them.)
3. So LeVerrier’s uses of ‘Vulcan’ do not refer to Vulcan.
I think Priest is best interpreted as rejecting (1). According to Priest, the reference of a description, including an indefinite description, is fixed by speakers’ intentions. So provided some planet was the one LeVerrier was thinking about, LeVerrier could even succeed in referring to it via indefinite description. So Caplan’s objection, directed against Priest, is unsound.
Braun’s Second Objection (See section 8 of Braun for the passage from which the following is extracted.)
1. If LeVerrier had a standing intention to the effect that if nothing actual satisfies his description, then ‘Vulcan’ does not refer to anything, then LeVerrier’s uses of ‘Vulcan’ did not refer to anything.
2. LeVerrier had a standing intention to that effect.
3. So, LeVerrier’s uses of ‘Vulcan’ did not refer to anything.
Let’s assume (2) is correct. If it’s not, it doesn’t matter much. We could introduce a name now with such an intention and we could re-state the objection using our new name. So what can Priest say against premise (1)?
A Priestly Reply
Priest might begin by noting that, on his view, the argument contains an ambiguity. ‘Vulcan’ does not refer to anything may be understood in the following ways:
(1a) (upside down 'A')x ~ (‘Vulcan’ refers to x)
(1u) (crazy U)x ~ (‘Vulcan’ refers to x)
If LeVerrier’s intention is best understood in the first way, then Priest could grant that the argument is sound, since (1a) is true but (1u) is false, on Priest’s view. What if LeVerrier’s intention is best understood in the second way?
The best I can do on Priest’s behalf is to suppose that LeVerrier had some “Vulcan-y” mental representation and he intended his theory to be a theory of the thing so represented. This thing, on Priest’s view, is a non-existent planet that perturbs the orbit of Mercury. Perhaps such an intention overrides the standing intention for the name to be non-referring if there is nothing that actually satisfies the relevant reference-fixing description. Thus (perhaps) Priest can deny (1) under the second reading.
Braun may reply that LeVerrier almost certainly intended that ‘Vulcan’ refer to something that actually exists. If this is a condition on LeVerrier’s successful reference, and it is not met, then it is plausible to suppose that LeVerrier’s uses of ‘Vulcan’ did not refer. These are extremely difficult issues to sort out, however. So let’s turn to some further considerations that are more specific to Priest’s view.
Further Criticisms
There are two ways a name may be non-referring:
(1) There may not be anything (in the ‘crazy U’ sense) that is even a candidate for being the referent of the name. (It is perhaps easiest to see how this could happen on the serious presentist view.)
(2) There may be a candidate, but the conditions on reference may not be met.
I. Violations of (2)
If Priest’s view is correct, then it is pretty easy to meet the conditions on reference. Simply imagining something and mentally focusing on it seems sufficient. But there are or could be cases in which a name or simple singular term could be introduced without the corresponding mental focusing.
The simplest case involves demonstratives. Suppose you use ‘that’ while not intending anything in particular. Then your use is empty, even on Priest’s view. Were you to introduce a name under similar mental conditions, presumably that name would be empty as well. Suppose S introduces n into L without the proper intention. We can put the problem as follows:
1. If Priest’s view is correct, then S’s uses of n are empty.
2. If S’s uses of n are empty, then Priest’s view does not provide a fully general solution to the paradox of nonexistence.
3. So if Priest’s view is correct, then Priest’s view does not provide a fully general solution to the paradox of nonexistence.
Priest might note that such names are quite bizarre and rare; we don’t have the sorts of intuitions about these uses of names that we seem to have about, say, ‘Zeus’. But note that if the name “caught on” in the language, it’s plausible that people would develop such intuitions. So this seems to me to be something of a problem for Priest.
II. Violations of (1)
It seems to me however that there are bigger problems for Priest. If his view is correct, then there are violations of condition (1) as well. These problems have to do with the Characterization Principle. So if these considerations are correct, they not only show that Priest’s view does not provide a fully general solution to the paradox of nonexistence. They also show that (CP) does not do what Priest wants it to do.
The first objection is similar to the one in Beall’s review of Priest’s book. It was also discovered independently by Dan.
In English, there is a use of ‘actual’ according to which it is an indexical that rigidly designates the world of the speaker. It seems we can imagine an actual green elephant in the seminar room. Let’s do that. Now let’s introduce a name for it: Let ‘Randall Farnsworth’ refer to the actual green elephant in the room, and no thing otherwise.
1. If Priest’s view is correct, then there is no existent or nonexistent object that is the actual green elephant in the seminar room.
2. If there is no existent or nonexistent object that is the actual green elephant in the seminar room, then ‘Randall Farnsworth’ is an empty name.
3. If ‘Randall Farnsworth’ is an empty name, then Priest’s view does not provide a fully general solution to the paradox of nonexistence.
4. So if Priest’s view is correct, then Priest’s view does not provide a fully general solution to the paradox of nonexistence.
Beall hedges on whether there is such a use of ‘actual’. I am less reserved than Beall on the matter. It is clear that there is such a use in English. But even if Beall is right, we need not rest our case on this example. Call anything that is either a possible, impossible, closed, or open world a circumstance. Now let’s introduce an operator, ‘Super’, that satisfies the following condition:
'Super (Fx)' is true with respect to a circumstance under an assignment iff '(Fx)' is true with respect to absolutely every circumstance.
Now imagine the super green elephant in the seminar room. We may re-state the objection after engaging in a naming ceremony as before and replacing ‘actual’ in the objection with ‘super’.
I conclude that Priest’s view does not provide a fully general solution to the paradox of nonexistence. So this is not an advantage it has over non-noneist views.
I should add, though, that on some scores noneism seems to do a bit better than the alternatives. Consider something like Braun’s view. On it, the following sentences as uttered by LeVerrier get the following truth values:
1. ‘Vulcan’ refers to Vulcan F
2. Vulcan does not exist T
3. Vulcan is identical to Vulcan F
4. Vulcan is an abstract object F
5. Vulcan is as hot as Vulcan F
6. ‘Vulcan’ refers to Randall Farnsworth F
7. Vulcan is as hot as Randall Farnsworth F
8. Vulcan is identical to Randall Farnsworth F
Uttered by us, things are different (since we refer to the mythical/imaginary objects):
1. T
2. F
3. T
4. T
5. T?
6. F
7. T?
8. F
On Priest’s view we have:
1. T
2. T
3. T
4. F (I think—he contrasts fictional objects with mathematical and other abstract objects, but does not explicitly rule on mythical objects. At any rate, I think it is more intuitive to suppose (4) is false.)
5. T?
6. F
7. T?
8. F
Priest’s rulings on (1-4) may line up better with our pre-theoretic intuitions. But if Braun is right and such intuitions are deeply confused and inconsistent, this may not be much of an advantage.
Braun’s First Objection
1. If LeVerrier’s uses of ‘Vulcan’ referred to Vulcan, then Vulcan satisfies the reference-fixing description by which LeVerrier introduced the name.
2. Vulcan does not satisfy that description.
3. So LeVerrier’s uses of ‘Vulcan’ did not refer to Vulcan.
4. If (3), then there are empty names.
5. So there are empty names.
(1) Given the theory of reference, LeVerrier’s initial uses of ‘Vulcan’ either refer because LeVerrier was in causal/perceptual contact with Vulcan, or because Vulcan satisfies the reference-fixing description via which LeVerrier introduced the name. Since the former is not the case, the latter must be. So (1) is true.
(2) If our uses of ‘Vulcan’ refer, then they refer to an abstract mythical object that is not a planet, perturbs no orbits, etc. So (2) is true.
A Priestly Reply
I think Priest would deny (2). Priest, as with all Meinongians, defends a version of the Characterization Principle. Its naïve form is as follows:
(CP) For any property or conjunction of properties A(x), we can characterize an object o and be guaranteed that A(o).
(CP) is unacceptable in this form. We can use (CP) to prove the existence of arbitrary entities; worse, we can use it to prove arbitrary truths. (CP) is inconsistent.
Proof of Arbitrary Existing Entities
The trick here is just to include existence in the set of properties. So let A(x) be any conjunction of properties, and let B = A(x) & E(x). By applying (CP) to B, we have an object o such that A(o) & E(o). So we’ve proved that something with an arbitrary conjunction of properties exists.
Proof of Arbitrary Truth
Let A be an arbitrary sentence. Let B = [(x = x) & A]. By applying (CP) to B, we have an object o such that (o = o) & A. By conjunction elimination, we infer A.
This sort of problem, noted by Russell and others, has prompted Meinongians to seek restrictions on (CP) that are consistent but remain true to the spirit of the Meinongian idea that an object of thought can be characterized in just about any way and still be thought of.
Priest’s proposal is novel. Let A(x) be any conjunction of properties. One can intend an object that satisfies exactly those properties. Let ‘o’ rigidly designate that object. If a is the intending agent, and B is the relevant intentional operator, then aB(A(o)) is true at @. So at every w such that w is accessible from @ under B for a, A(o) is true at w. That is, the objects in question do not necessarily have all of their characterinzig properties at the actual world, but they do have them at some world or other.
Before returning to Priest’s reply to Braun’s first argument, let’s forestall a potential objection to Priest’s proposal. Suppose ‘Necessarily F’ is our characterizing property. Then in some world, there is an object that has that property. But doesn’t this entail that that object is actually F? No. The world in question must be an impossible world if the object in question is not actually necessarily F.
Given Priest’s version of (CP), Priest may resist (2). Vulcan does have the properties specified in the reference-fixing description 'the planet causing perturbations in the orbit of Mercury'. It just does not have them actually. So Priest may avoid Braun’s first objection. (We might worry about what happens if the reference-fixing description is 'the actual planet causing perturbations in the orbit of Mercury'. Let's hold that thought for a minute and grant that Priest can avoid objection one.)
Caplan’s Objection
Priest’s reply to Braun’s first objection appears to play him into the hands of an objection from Caplan, however (plausibly, this sort of objection is originally attributable to Kripke). Priest’s view is that something has the properties LeVerrier attributed to Vulcan at some non-actual world. But it is not the only such thing. There are infinitely many possible objects, in fact, that have the properties LeVerrier attributed to Vulcan. So the description is not reference-fixing, since it is not definite. The description is satisfied by many non-existent objects. We can state the objection as follows:
1. If LeVerrier’s uses of ‘Vulcan’ refer to Vulcan, then there is a unique entity that satisfies the reference-fixing description, 'the planet causing perturbations in the orbit of Mercury'.
2. There is no unique entity that satisfies that description. (On Priest’s view, there are too many of them.)
3. So LeVerrier’s uses of ‘Vulcan’ do not refer to Vulcan.
I think Priest is best interpreted as rejecting (1). According to Priest, the reference of a description, including an indefinite description, is fixed by speakers’ intentions. So provided some planet was the one LeVerrier was thinking about, LeVerrier could even succeed in referring to it via indefinite description. So Caplan’s objection, directed against Priest, is unsound.
Braun’s Second Objection (See section 8 of Braun for the passage from which the following is extracted.)
1. If LeVerrier had a standing intention to the effect that if nothing actual satisfies his description, then ‘Vulcan’ does not refer to anything, then LeVerrier’s uses of ‘Vulcan’ did not refer to anything.
2. LeVerrier had a standing intention to that effect.
3. So, LeVerrier’s uses of ‘Vulcan’ did not refer to anything.
Let’s assume (2) is correct. If it’s not, it doesn’t matter much. We could introduce a name now with such an intention and we could re-state the objection using our new name. So what can Priest say against premise (1)?
A Priestly Reply
Priest might begin by noting that, on his view, the argument contains an ambiguity. ‘Vulcan’ does not refer to anything may be understood in the following ways:
(1a) (upside down 'A')x ~ (‘Vulcan’ refers to x)
(1u) (crazy U)x ~ (‘Vulcan’ refers to x)
If LeVerrier’s intention is best understood in the first way, then Priest could grant that the argument is sound, since (1a) is true but (1u) is false, on Priest’s view. What if LeVerrier’s intention is best understood in the second way?
The best I can do on Priest’s behalf is to suppose that LeVerrier had some “Vulcan-y” mental representation and he intended his theory to be a theory of the thing so represented. This thing, on Priest’s view, is a non-existent planet that perturbs the orbit of Mercury. Perhaps such an intention overrides the standing intention for the name to be non-referring if there is nothing that actually satisfies the relevant reference-fixing description. Thus (perhaps) Priest can deny (1) under the second reading.
Braun may reply that LeVerrier almost certainly intended that ‘Vulcan’ refer to something that actually exists. If this is a condition on LeVerrier’s successful reference, and it is not met, then it is plausible to suppose that LeVerrier’s uses of ‘Vulcan’ did not refer. These are extremely difficult issues to sort out, however. So let’s turn to some further considerations that are more specific to Priest’s view.
Further Criticisms
There are two ways a name may be non-referring:
(1) There may not be anything (in the ‘crazy U’ sense) that is even a candidate for being the referent of the name. (It is perhaps easiest to see how this could happen on the serious presentist view.)
(2) There may be a candidate, but the conditions on reference may not be met.
I. Violations of (2)
If Priest’s view is correct, then it is pretty easy to meet the conditions on reference. Simply imagining something and mentally focusing on it seems sufficient. But there are or could be cases in which a name or simple singular term could be introduced without the corresponding mental focusing.
The simplest case involves demonstratives. Suppose you use ‘that’ while not intending anything in particular. Then your use is empty, even on Priest’s view. Were you to introduce a name under similar mental conditions, presumably that name would be empty as well. Suppose S introduces n into L without the proper intention. We can put the problem as follows:
1. If Priest’s view is correct, then S’s uses of n are empty.
2. If S’s uses of n are empty, then Priest’s view does not provide a fully general solution to the paradox of nonexistence.
3. So if Priest’s view is correct, then Priest’s view does not provide a fully general solution to the paradox of nonexistence.
Priest might note that such names are quite bizarre and rare; we don’t have the sorts of intuitions about these uses of names that we seem to have about, say, ‘Zeus’. But note that if the name “caught on” in the language, it’s plausible that people would develop such intuitions. So this seems to me to be something of a problem for Priest.
II. Violations of (1)
It seems to me however that there are bigger problems for Priest. If his view is correct, then there are violations of condition (1) as well. These problems have to do with the Characterization Principle. So if these considerations are correct, they not only show that Priest’s view does not provide a fully general solution to the paradox of nonexistence. They also show that (CP) does not do what Priest wants it to do.
The first objection is similar to the one in Beall’s review of Priest’s book. It was also discovered independently by Dan.
In English, there is a use of ‘actual’ according to which it is an indexical that rigidly designates the world of the speaker. It seems we can imagine an actual green elephant in the seminar room. Let’s do that. Now let’s introduce a name for it: Let ‘Randall Farnsworth’ refer to the actual green elephant in the room, and no thing otherwise.
1. If Priest’s view is correct, then there is no existent or nonexistent object that is the actual green elephant in the seminar room.
2. If there is no existent or nonexistent object that is the actual green elephant in the seminar room, then ‘Randall Farnsworth’ is an empty name.
3. If ‘Randall Farnsworth’ is an empty name, then Priest’s view does not provide a fully general solution to the paradox of nonexistence.
4. So if Priest’s view is correct, then Priest’s view does not provide a fully general solution to the paradox of nonexistence.
Beall hedges on whether there is such a use of ‘actual’. I am less reserved than Beall on the matter. It is clear that there is such a use in English. But even if Beall is right, we need not rest our case on this example. Call anything that is either a possible, impossible, closed, or open world a circumstance. Now let’s introduce an operator, ‘Super’, that satisfies the following condition:
'Super (Fx)' is true with respect to a circumstance under an assignment iff '(Fx)' is true with respect to absolutely every circumstance.
Now imagine the super green elephant in the seminar room. We may re-state the objection after engaging in a naming ceremony as before and replacing ‘actual’ in the objection with ‘super’.
I conclude that Priest’s view does not provide a fully general solution to the paradox of nonexistence. So this is not an advantage it has over non-noneist views.
I should add, though, that on some scores noneism seems to do a bit better than the alternatives. Consider something like Braun’s view. On it, the following sentences as uttered by LeVerrier get the following truth values:
1. ‘Vulcan’ refers to Vulcan F
2. Vulcan does not exist T
3. Vulcan is identical to Vulcan F
4. Vulcan is an abstract object F
5. Vulcan is as hot as Vulcan F
6. ‘Vulcan’ refers to Randall Farnsworth F
7. Vulcan is as hot as Randall Farnsworth F
8. Vulcan is identical to Randall Farnsworth F
Uttered by us, things are different (since we refer to the mythical/imaginary objects):
1. T
2. F
3. T
4. T
5. T?
6. F
7. T?
8. F
On Priest’s view we have:
1. T
2. T
3. T
4. F (I think—he contrasts fictional objects with mathematical and other abstract objects, but does not explicitly rule on mythical objects. At any rate, I think it is more intuitive to suppose (4) is false.)
5. T?
6. F
7. T?
8. F
Priest’s rulings on (1-4) may line up better with our pre-theoretic intuitions. But if Braun is right and such intuitions are deeply confused and inconsistent, this may not be much of an advantage.
posted by Chris Tillman at 5:58 PM
1 Comments:
A couple comments:
1) I don't see that the mere existence of an empty name makes Priest's theory not satisfy the paradoxes of non-existence to full generality, provided these names are "wierd" enough that competent speakers would consider them meaningless, and perhaps even sentences containing them meaningless. For most of the paradoxes, if you replace "Zeus" with "framus" the arguments are significantly weakened. It seems like forcing a name to be empty in some cases would yeild a something as meaningless as "framus".
If a meaningless name did start to catch on in a language, could Priest not say that it's adopting a referent in the same way? The referent would come from whatever people mean when they utter the name (surely there's one of those kicking around the ontology somewhere, enjoying its non-existence).
2) I see a problem in Priest's response to Caplan. Caplan argues that under Priest's view, LeVerrier fails to refer to a unique individual when he utters of 'Vulcan', because there are many non-existent objects that satisfy the conditions in the baptism. Priest could say back that LeVerier refers to whichever one he was thinking of. This is intuitively puzzling. By default, when we think of an object we bear the thinking-about relation to the object as it exists in the actual world. Even if I've never seen the largest crater on the dark side of the moon, I can still think of it. If I were to go to the moon and find it, I would probably discover that it's very different from my conception. Nonetheless, my thought was able to have it as a referent (as aposed to the largest crater at some other world) partly in virtue of its actualy existing. So I simply ask again on Caplan's behalf, which Vulcan is LV thinking of? If it's the one closest related to the phenomenology of his thoughts, then Priest would need to explain why this is not also the case when we think of actually existing objects. If it isn't the one closest related to the phenomenology of his thoughts, then which is it? (note, this even assumes there is a unique Vulcan that is closest related to the phenomenology of LV's thoughts)
One might say that 'Vulcan' refers to the incomplete object at an open world W that has only the properties LeVerrier describes, but this doesn't seem right. This is not what LeVerrier would expect to find if he went looking for Vulcan. Perhaps it's less of a problem if we consider Vulcan as a world-invarient function from worlds to identities. Then maybe Priest can say that Vulcan refers to the unique world-invarient object that satisfies LV's conditions in every world in which it's instantiated. This doesn't seem right either, for if one were to ask LV, "could Vulcan not have perturbed mercury" LV could reply "sure, if its orbit were outside of pluto". This would mean that Vulcan as a world-invarient object doesn't satisfy LV's conditions out of necessity. But in that case, there are many world-invarient objects that 'Vulcan' could refer to.
excuse my rather rambling search for a referent for 'Vulcan'. If anyone has an idea of how LV's thoughts are able to point to a particular non-actual object based on an indefinite description, my ears are open.
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